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The present study investigated the influence of medical expertise, case typicality, and illness script
component (enabling conditions vs. consequences) on the speed of case information processing and
subjective disease probabilities. It was hypothesized that expert subjects would process case infor-
mation faster than nonexpert subjects, that typical information would be processed faster than atyp-
ical information, and that an interaction would be found between expertise level, typicality, and ill-
ness script: Experts were expected to be sensitive to typicality of both illness script components,
while advanced students would be sensitive only to typicality of consequences. This sensitivity
would also be reflected in assigned probability estimates. The data supported the predictions con-
cerning the effects of expertise level and typicality; it was also found that expert physicians are par-
ticularly sensitive to a combination of prototypical enabling conditions and prototypical conse-
quences. Implications of these results for the illness script theory are discussed.
Up until about 1980, the essence of medical expertise
was generally conceived ofas good medical problem solv-
ing (see, e.g., Elstein, Shulman, & Spratka, 1978). Expert
physicians' diagnostic problem-solving processes, ex-
pressed by parameters like thoroughness, quality of
problem-solving strategies, efficiency, number ofhypothe-
ses considered, and use ofcritical cues, were assumed to
account for their diagnostic superiority over students or
less experienced physicians. This emphasis on the quality
ofthe medical problem-solving process was to a large ex-
tent a consequence of the general interest at that time in
the formal aspects ofhuman problem solving: the impor-
tant influence of the work ofNewell and Simon (Newell,
Shaw, & Simon, 1958; Newell & Simon, 1972) attests to
this view. Furthermore, expectations were high as to the
possibility of implementing medical diagnostic knowl-
edge in expert systems (see, e.g., Clancey & Shortliffe,
1984; Lusted, 1968; Swanson, Feltovich, & Johnson,
1977). In line with the general design ofproblem-solving
systems, in these early medical expert systems, a distinc-
tion was made between disease knowledge and diagnos-
tic control knowledge (see Clancey & Shortliffe, 1984).
This distinction was paralleled in medical education by
efforts to teach students to become good medical prob-
lem solvers, that is, to develop their diagnostic control
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knowledge, rather than to stuff them with medical facts,
which were thought to become obsolete very quickly.
However, in a number of studies specifically designed
to investigate problem-solving differences between out-
standing and average physicians, Elstein et al. (1978) failed
to find most of the relevant predicted differences in
problem-solving characteristics. No differences were
found between excellent and average physicians on vari-
ables like number of information search units, moment
of generating first hypothesis, number of currently acti-
vated hypotheses, total number ofhypotheses generated,
percentage and number of cues discovered, and percent-
age and number ofcritical findings. Furthermore, gener-
alizability across similar problems turned out to be quite
low, a finding that also contradicts the view that empha-
sizes procedural aspects of problem solving rather than
knowledge-related aspects.
Elstein et al. (1978) also found that, in contrast with
the expectations, early hypothesis generation turned out
to be a feature of both medical experts and preclinical
students. In problem-solving terms, the function ofearly
hypothesis generation is to constrain the search space
and to reduce cognitive load. Differences between experts
and nonexperts were revealed mainly by the quality of
the diagnostic hypotheses generated. Indeed, Barrows,
Norman, Neufeld, and Feightner (1982) found that if the
correct diagnostic hypothesis is included in the initial set
of working hypotheses, it is almost always recognized as
the definite solution, while if the correct hypothesis is
not included in this set, it is missed in about 6 out of 7
cases. Since the ability to generate correct hypotheses in
an early stage of the diagnostic process is probably de-
pendent on the way diagnostic knowledge is organized in
memory, it may be assumed that this knowledge organi-
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zation is a critical factor in medical diagnostic expertise.
This is also the upshot ofthe work of, among others, Patel
and Groen (1986, 1991); Feltovich, Johnson, Moller, and
Swanson (1984); and Barrows and Feltovich (1987).
Thus, experts' diagnostic superiority should be attrib-
uted to their knowledge organization, rather than to vari-
ables associated with the problem-solving process.
Structuring ofMedical Diagnostic Knowledge:
The illness Script Concept
In cognitive psychology, there are several approaches to
describing the organization of complex knowledge struc-
tures involved in problem solving: production systems
(Anderson, 1983, 1993), connectionistic models (Rumel-
hart & McClelland, 1986), prototypes (Rosch, 1978),
frames (Minsky, 1975), schemas (Bartlett, 1932/1954;
Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977), mental models (Gentner &
Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983), scripts (Bower,
Black, & Turner, 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977), indi-
vidual instances (Brooks, Norman, & Allen, 1991), and
cases or prior problem-solving episodes (Kolodner, 1988;
Kolodner & Simpson, 1986, 1989).
In accordance with Feltovich and Barrows (1984), we
propose the illness script as the knowledge structure
most pertinent in medical diagnostic situations. An ill-
ness script is a narrative structure consisting of three main
components: (1) enabling conditions, that is, patient con-
textual factors that influence the probability that some-
one has a specific disease (e.g., age, sex, previous med-
ical history, current medication, occupation, hereditary
and environmental influences, risk behavior); (2) the
fault, that is, the major real malfunctions in illness, char-
acterized in biomedical terms, like the invasion of tissue
by pathogenic organisms; and (3) the consequences, that
is, the different complaints, signs, and symptoms a spe-
cific fault might lead to. According to Feltovich and Bar-
rows, an illness script is constructed for each individual
patient; however, in line with Schank and Abelson's (1977)
original script idea, we prefer to conceptualize illness
scripts as precompiled packages ofdiagnostic and clinical
knowledge describing a general sequence of events that
may be expected to occur when someone suffers from a
particular disease. Like the Schank and Abelson scripts,
illness scripts are activated as integrated wholes and in-
stantiated by the data available in the current case: Script
instantiation consists of the substitution of default slot
values and characteristics by the actual features and val-
ues of the patient. In a practical diagnostic situation, the
information available in the initial stages of the diagnos-
tic encounter determines to a large extent which illness
scripts are activated and how they are instantiated. The
finding ofElstein et ai. (1978) that the superior quality of
early diagnostic hypotheses is an important feature ofex-
cellent physicians' diagnostic performance suggests that
the ability to activate the appropriate illness scripts as a
consequence of the information available in the early
stages of the diagnostic process is an important feature of
superior diagnostic achievement.
According to the illness script theory, the better part of
the information available in such an early stage ofthe di-
agnostic encounter consists of enabling conditions: the
patient background and contextual factors (Hobus, Bos-
huizen, & Schmidt, 1990; Hobus, Schmidt, Boshuizen,
& Patel, 1987; Schmidt, Norman, & Boshuizen, 1990).
Although enabling conditions consist partly of'nonmed-
ical, aspecific background information, as defined by
Weber, Bockenholt, Hilton, and Wallace (1993), it should
be emphasized that the enabling conditions of illness
scripts can also include medical and specific information,
as long as this information influences the probability that
a specific disease is present. Information about heredi-
tary conditions and current medication, for example, may
form part of the enabling conditions for a disease. It is
also important to note that the relationship between the
enabling conditions and the fault is of a psychological
and probabilistic, rather than ofa medical and causal na-
ture: For example, risk behavior (e.g., alcoholism) may
in general increase the possibility that a particular dis-
ease (e.g., pancreatitis) is present, even though in a par-
ticular case, these events may be unrelated. The two most
important features of enabling conditions are their poten-
tial availability in an early stage ofthe diagnostic consul-
tation and their probabilistic relationship to the presence
of certain diseases. Ofcourse, ifa physician is not famil-
iar with a particular patient's context and background,
and no medical file is present, it will be impossible for
him/her to exploit enabling conditions other than those
immediately visible. Indeed, as Hobus et ai. (1987, 1990)
have shown, physicians may be seriously handicapped if
information about a patient's background and context is
missing.
In addition to the enabling conditions, some conse-
quences may also be available in an early stage of the di-
agnostic encounter. The most pressing complaint is usu-
ally voiced by the patient, and occasionally, a sign may
be immediately visible (e.g., yellow sclera). However,
much of the relevant information about consequences
will be revealed only as a result of leading questions or
physical examination, and hence will become available
in a much later stage of the consultation.
Findings by Hobus et a1. (1987, 1988, 1990) suggest
that expert physicians can arrive at quite accurate diag-
noses on the basis of the scarce initial information avail-
able in an early stage of the diagnostic process (see El-
stein et aI., 1978) because they are much better able to use
enabling conditions to activate the appropriate illness
scripts than are less experienced physicians. For exam-
ple, Hobus et ai. (1988) found an increase of about 37%
in diagnostic accuracy for recently graduated MDs as a
consequence of the availability of enabling conditions
(compared to a situation in which only a complaint was
provided), while this increase amounted to about 75%
for experienced family physicians. These findings were
essentially confirmed by the Hobus et ai. (1990) study.
If the patient to be diagnosed shows all or most of the
expected enabling conditions and consequences, as in the
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Hobus et al. (1988, 1990) studies, activation and instan-
tiation of the appropriate illness script usually do not form
a problem, particularly for experienced physicians. In fact,
this is equivalent to a routine diagnostic situation. How-
ever, patients, even if they suffer from the same disease,
may show a large variability as to their background, con-
text, complaints, signs, and symptoms. Illness scripts are
assumed to be particularly tuned to this real-life varia-
tion. Thus, the illness script slots allow for a certain range
of values of variables, and for the absence or presence of
certain features. However, this does not preclude the pos-
sibility that illness script instantiation on the basis ofde-
fault or typical values and features is generally easier than
illness script instantiation on the basis of less common
values and features, given a particular disease.
Consequences ofthe Script Properties
of illness Scripts
The distinction between typical and atypical informa-
tion in illness scripts has certain processing implications.
Scripts are activated as integrated wholes, that is, in an
all-or-none fashion. Whether script activation is de-
scribed in terms of tagging atypical script actions and
concepts to a generic structure (see Graesser, Woll, Ko-
walski, & Smith, 1980; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Smith
& Graesser, 1981) or in terms of the activation of an un-
derlying network (see Walker & Yekovich, 1984; Yeko-
vich & Walker, 1986, 1987), the resulting predictions are
highly similar. Activation and default instantiation of a
script results in activation of the most typical features
and instantiation of the most likely slot values; conse-
quently, new incoming information that is highly typical
for the script in question will be processed with a mini-
mum of effort, because it is already activated. Informa-
tion ofa more atypical nature, on the other hand, will not
coincide immediately with typical concepts or actions,
or with the default values of the slots; hence, a certain
amount ofjudgment, reflection, or elaboration will be re-
quired to adjust the current, default, script instantiation.
This process may be expected to take more time than will
the "smooth" processing of typical features and slot
values. Thus, it may be expected that processing time for
atypical script information, as evidenced by reading
time, will be longer than processing time for typical script
information. Indeed, Bellezza and Bower (1981) found
that atypical script actions, in which objects or entities
appeared that could not immediately be fit into script
slots, took longer to process than typical script actions.
If illness scripts can be conceived ofas a specific kind of
the Schank and Abelson (1977) scripts, it may be ex-
pected that the results of Bellezza and Bower (1981) will
also apply to illness scripts. An important goal of this ar-
ticle is to test this hypothesis.
Another issue is also relevant here. In contrast with
Schank and Abelson (1977) scripts, the activation and
instantiation of illness scripts in practical situations is
generally a probabilistic affair. One cannot always be
sure that a patient indeed suffers from a particular dis-
ease (i.e., that a specific illness script is applicable). In
most studies investigating Schank and Abelson (1977)
scripts, the appropriateness of the script is merely a mat-
ter of fact (e.g., "John and Mary went to a restaurant."
"Jack went to the dentist."). In short, script competition
is common in medical diagnosis, but not in daily social
situations. Thus, information that is at variance with the
activated script will be handled differently in both cases:
For illness scripts, it will result in a decrease of the prob-
ability that the currently activated script is applicable,
whereas for Schank and Abelson (1977) scripts, it will
be tagged or explicitly activated as an unexpected, prob-
ably interesting event (see Smith & Graesser, 1981).
Thus, it may be expected that illness script instantiation
with atypical case information will lead to a decrease of
the subjective probability estimation concerning the
script's correctness. More specifically, if physicians are
asked to provide a likelihood estimation with respect to
a particular activated script, the value of this estimation
will show a monotonic relationship with the degree of
typicality of the patient described in the case. Highly
typical cases will be assigned a high likelihood value
(e.g., "The chances that this patient has disease X are
90% or higher."), whereas more atypical cases will re-
ceive lower probability estimates. In the present study,
we will try to confirm this expectation.
Expertise Level and illness Scripts:
Development ofScripted Knowledge
The results of several studies (e.g., Davidson & Hoe,
1993; Hudson, 1988; Nelson & Gruendel, 1986) suggest
that even preschool children have relatively well devel-
oped scripted knowledge structures, but for illness scripts,
the situation appears to be different. There is evidence
that it takes several years ofpractical, clinical experience
for full-fledged illness scripts to develop (Custers, Boshui-
zen, & Schmidt, 1992; Hobus et al., 1987). In addition,
the aforementioned findings ofHobus et al. (1987, 1990;
see also Hofstra, Hobus, Boshuizen, & Schmidt, 1988;
Schmidt, Boshuizen, & Norman, 1992) that the diag-
nostic performance of expert family physicians, unlike
that of inexperienced physicians, improves considerably
when information about the enabling conditions ofa pa-
tient is presented, provide evidence for a developmental
divergence of the different components of an illness
script. This difference seems to be due not to the inex-
perienced subjects actually lacking knowledge ofthe en-
abling conditions of diseases in general, but to their in-
ability to use this information when it comes down to
diagnosing a case (see Hobus et al., 1990; Custers et al.,
1992). The integration of enabling conditions into full-
fledged illness scripts is something that appears to occur
in a relatively late stage of the development of medical
expertise: Less experienced physicians rely mainly on
consequences as a source of activation of diagnostic hy-
potheses, whereas experienced physicians are able to ex-
ploit a combination ofboth enabling conditions and con-
sequences.
It may be hypothesized that these developmental dif-
ferences in illness script structure are reflected in infor-
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mation processing times. Since illness scripts of less ex-
perienced physicians are much less well established, less
coherent, and less integrated (Custers et aI., 1992), these
physicians will have to rely, at least to a certain extent,
on more elaborate processing of medical information in
order to comprehend and assimilate case information,
even if it is highly typical. In contrast, experienced phy-
sicians' comprehension is ofa much more immediate na-
ture (see Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993a, 1993b). Thus, it
may be expected that case processing in general, and pro-
cessing of typical cases in particular, will take inexperi-
enced physicians more time than expert physicians.
Atypical cases will be processed more slowly by subjects
at all levels ofexpertise; probably, for these cases, expert
physicians' processing speed will even decrease rela-
tively more than inexperienced subjects' processing speed.
On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that the effects
of typicality of case information and expertise level on
information processing times are additive, with subjects
at different levels of expertise being about equally im-
peded in processing speed by atypicality of information.
However, a more detailed prediction is also possible. As
suggested by Custers et al. (1992), advanced students or in-
experienced physicians will be sensitive mainly to typical-
ity of the consequences of a disease because their illness
scripts are relatively well developed with respect to this
component. Typicality ofenabling conditions, on the other
hand, will not exert a large influence on reading times for
these subjects. Unlike less experienced subjects, expert
physicians, whose knowledge about enabling conditions is
integrated into their illness scripts, will also be sensitive to
the typicality of enabling conditions and hence will show
shorter reading times for cases with typical enabling con-
ditions than for cases with atypical enabling conditions.
Similarly, experienced physicians will tend to take
typicality of both enabling conditions and consequences
into account in determining a probability estimate for a
specific case, while less experienced physicians will be
sensitive mainly to the typicality of consequences and
will not attach great weight to the typicality of enabling
conditions: They will be relatively insensitive to typical-
ity of patient background and contextual factors.
An experiment was designed to test these hypotheses.
Short case descriptions were constructed on the basis of
a number ofdifferent diseases. Each case description con-
sisted of a number of statements in which information
about enabling conditions or consequences ofthe patient
in question was provided. The case presentations were
computer based so that we could measure reading times
and record probability estimations. As typicality of both
enabling conditions and consequences was experimen-
tally manipulated, the influence ofthis factor on both read-
ing times and probability estimations could be experi-
mentally investigated. Subjects at two levels ofexpertise-
advanced students and experienced physicians-partic-
ipated. The following hypotheses were tested.
First, in general, experienced subjects were expected
to process case information more rapidly than less expe-
rienced subjects. Second, completely prototypical! cases
(i.e., cases with prototypical enabling conditions as well
as prototypical consequences) will generally be pro-
cessed more rapidly than completely atypical cases (i.e.,
cases with atypical enabling conditions as well as atypi-
cal consequences); processing times ofcases with either,
but not both, atypical enabling conditions or atypical
consequences, will fall somewhere in between. Third, an
interaction will be found between expertise level and
typicality ofenabling conditions: Experienced physicians
will be sensitive to typicality of enabling conditions,
whereas advanced students will not, or they show such
sensitivity to a lesser extent. No such interaction will be
expected for typicality ofconsequences; thus, the results
will show a three-way interaction among expertise level,
typicality, and illness script component: For expert sub-
jects, the effects of typicality and illness script compo-
nent on processing times will be additive, whereas for less
experienced subjects, an interaction between typicality
and illness script component will be found, with typical-
ity ofconsequences, unlike typicality of enabling condi-
tions, exerting an influence on processing times.
For the probability estimates, similar predictions will
hold. Completely prototypical cases will receive higher
probability estimates than will completely atypical cases,
with the probability estimates ofpartly prototypical, partly
atypical cases falling somewhere in between. Experienced
physicians will also be more sensitive to prototypicality
of enabling conditions than less experienced subjects,
who will mainly take consequences into consideration in
determining the probability of an instance of a specific
disease.
The role of script-inconsistent information (as opposed
to mere atypicality) was also investigated. For this pur-
pose, some cases were constructed in which a patient
was described as having both enabling conditions and
consequences that were completely contradictory to the
activated illness script. It was predicted that such cases
would be processed relatively quickly, because in an
early stage subjects are able to decide that the case is not
an instantiation of the announced disease (i.e., it is im-
possible to instantiate the activated illness script with
the case data). Consequently, probability estimates for
these cases will be close to zero.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were thirty 6th-year students from the Maastricht Fac-
ulty of Medicine and 30 experienced family physicians recruited
from one of three small towns in the southeastern part of The
Netherlands. The 6th-year students had either completed their resi-
dency or were about to complete it; they had on the average 2 years
experience in a clinical setting.? The family physicians had on the
average 11.75 years experience as general practitioners, ranging
from I to 25 years (clerkship and postgraduate training years not
included). Since it takes at least 2 years of additional education
after medical graduation to become a family physician, the least
experienced family physician had at least 5 years experience in a
practical setting (clerkship years included).
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Material
Case descriptions were constructed on the basis of 24 different
diseases (see Appendix A). Each case description consisted of a
number of statements in which information about the patient's
background, the setting (e.g., consultation hour, emergency tele-
phone call, requests for a visit), the introductory complaint, and
some symptoms and findings from physical examination was pro-
vided. The first three cases, which were used for training purposes
only, were identical for all experimental conditions.
For 16 of the remaining 21 diseases, 4 different case variants
were constructed. Each case variant consisted of a set of enabling
conditions statements followed by a set of consequences state-
ments. Such sets could be either prototypical or atypical. Typical-
ity of enabling conditions and consequences was independently
manipulated: Prototypical enabling conditions could be followed
by either prototypical or atypical consequences, and atypical en-
abling conditions could be followed by either prototypical (P) or
atypical (A) consequences. Case variants of these types were
called Pp,PA,AP,and AA, respectively; thus, the first A or P of the
type indication refers to the nature of the enabling conditions, the
second to the nature ofthe consequences. Prototypicality and atyp-
icality of case information were determined by analyzing the re-
sponses given by the subjects in a previous study (Custers et al.,
1992) in which they were asked to describe a prototypical patient
with each of the diseases used in the present study. It was assumed
that the enabling conditions and consequences that were men-
tioned by a large proportion of the experienced subjects in this
study might be considered prototypical, whereas features men-
tioned by only few subjects would be atypical. The case variants
constructed on the basis of this material were checked by three ex-
perienced physicians who were instructed to judge whether the en-
abling conditions and consequences were indeed prototypical or
atypical for the respective diseases.
An example of a disease with its four case variants can be found
in Appendix B. The total number of statements per case descrip-
tion ranged from 7 to 18. The four different variants of each dis-
ease case description always contained the same number of state-
ments, although the number ofwords could differ somewhat between
these variants. In Appendix C, information about the length of the
case descriptions is given.
Since only one variant of each case could be presented to every
subject, 4 different sequences of cases had to be constructed, with
each of the 4 variants of any case (PP, Ap, PA, and AA) appearing
in only I of the sequences. These sequences were constructed by
assigning the 16 experimental diseases randomly to 4 groups of 4
diseases. For the first group, the 4 PP cases were assigned to I of
these sequences, the AP cases to the next sequence, and so on. This
procedure was repeated for the other 3 groups of 4 diseases, under
the constraint that in the end each experimental sequence con-
sisted of 4 cases of each type: PP, AP, PA, and AA. The order in
which the individual cases appeared in the sequences was ran-
domly determined, but it was identical for the 4 sequences and re-
mained fixed during the experiment.
For the remaining 5 diseases, so-called no-cases (NO type cases)
were constructed. These were cases in which a patient was de-
scribed with a disease that was completely different from that sug-
gested by the illness script header (i.e., the presumed diagnosis).
Appendix A shows the diseases on which these cases were actually
based, as well as the incompatible script headings. Since there was
only one variant of the NO type cases, they were the same for all 4
sequences, and they were inserted at random positions in the se-
quences.
To control for possible order effects, an A-form and a B-form
were constructed for each of the 4 case sequences. In the A-form
of each sequence, Cases 4-13 were shown first and then Cases 14-
24; in the B-form, this order was reversed. Practice Cases 1-3
were always presented first. Appendix D provides a complete over-
view of the sequence design.
Screen texts appeared in black on a white background (Palatino
18 point); no colors were used. The text lines were centered on the
screen. Using a press-button device with three buttons (a button la-
beled yes, a button labeled no, and an unlabeled button for pro-
ceeding through the case description), together with an experi-
mental program called PET, made it possible to measure reading
times of individual statements with an accuracy of I msec. The
main program was written in Authorware.
Procedure
According to the order of participation, subjects in both exper-
tise groups were assigned to I of the 8 case sequences. They were
tested individually, the 6th-year students at the university office,
and the family physicians in their consulting rooms. Subjects were
seated in front ofa computer screen and given a short introduction.
Next, the experimenter started the session by saying, "Read the
first case and decide whether this is a patient with X" (X being the
disease on which the first case presentation was based). Subse-
quently, the experimenter started the case presentation and the first
statement of the first case appeared on the screen. Subjects had to
push a button on the press-button device to proceed through the
case. They were instructed to read each case description as thor-
oughly and as fast as possible and to judge whether the patient de-
scribed in the case actually suffered from the disease announced by
the experimenter at the beginning of the case presentation. Every
time they pushed the button to proceed through the case descrip-
tion, the current case statement disappeared from the screen and
the reading time for that particular statement was recorded. Sub-
sequently, the next statement was presented.
At the end ofevery case description, subjects first had to answer
a case evaluation question, phrased as a forced-choice question: "Is
this a patient with X, yes or no?" ("X" being the name of the dis-
ease announced at the beginning of the case presentation). Subjects
could make their choice by pressing either a yes or a no button on
the press-button device they had at their disposal. At that point, no
other options were available. Next, they had to estimate the prob-
ability, expressed as a percentage value, that the presented case de-
scription actually matched a patient with that specific disease.
All reading times were measured in milliseconds. Since these
times were in the order ofmagnitude of at least 500-600 msec, but
often even lasted several seconds, between-subject differences in
the time needed to perform the physical response ofpressing a but-
ton might be considered negligible. Reading times were also mea-
sured for the case evaluation question, but not for the probability
estimations: Deciding on the "exact" quantitative size of a likelihood
was not considered part of case information processing. After the
subject had made the probability estimation, a pause screen ap-
peared. Subsequently the experimenter announced the next disease
in the sequence, and started the presentation of the next case.
After finishing the task, subjects were debriefed. The main pur-
poses of the study were explained, and subjects were given an op-
portunity to ask questions or to make remarks. Finally, they re-
ceived a reward for participating in the study.
Analysis
Average reading times for separate case statements, for the en-
abling conditions and consequences parts of cases, for complete
cases, and for the case evaluation questions, were computed. To
control for differences in length of corresponding case statements,
reading times were expressed in milliseconds per word for indi-
vidual statements as well as for complete cases. Besides reading
times, the mean percentage estimates for each subject over the
cases of the same type were calculated.
The data on one of the NO cases (i.e., the one in which a patient
actually suffering from pernicious anemia was announced as some-
one with iron-deficiency anemia) were discarded because many
subjects apparently confused both ailments. Because of occasional
disturbances during an experimental session, a small number of
MEDICAL EXPERTISE AND CASE PROCESSING 389
reading times of individual statements had to be removed from the
analysis; if this had to be done, average reading times of enabling
conditions and consequences were computed using the remaining,
undisturbed reading times of the case statements. For I subject, 3
cases, and for another subject, I case had to be completely re-
moved; hence, their reading times for the particular case types
were computed over 3 instead of 4 cases. Furthermore, if a no an-
swer on the case evaluation question was followed by a percentage
estimate higher than 50, or ifayes answer on this question was fol-
lowed by an estimate below 50, the respective probability esti-
mates were also excluded from the analysis.' In all, for every sub-
ject for all case types, reaction times were available, though in a
few cases these were based on fewer than 4 cases for each type. As
far as the probability estimates are concerned, the data of two 6th-
year students could not be included in the overall within-subject
analysis because the probability estimates for 2 of the 4 cases of
one specific type could not be computed, and probability esti-
mates based on only 2 cases of a type were considered too unreli-
able. The data of these subjects were included in those analyses in
which the missing case type data were not involved, though.
The procedure described above finally yielded the following
measures per subject and per case type:
I. Average reading times for individual statements, for clusters
of statements, and for complete case descriptions, expressed in
milliseconds per word. Reading times for the case evaluation ques-
tion are included in the average reading times for the complete case
descriptions, since they are considered to reflect additional infor-
mation processing of scripted information. These times were also
analyzed separately as case evaluation latencies.
2. Average probability estimates expressed as percentages. The
reading times of complete cases, including the case evaluation la-
tencies, were analyzed in a 2 X 4 analysis of variance (ANaYA)
with expertise level as the between-subjects factor and case type as
the within-subject factor. The NO cases were not included in this
analysis because we had no preconceived notion about the case
processing times for these cases and could not exclude the possi-
bility that they might cloud a possible interaction effect between
expertise level and typicality. To test the hypothesized three-way
interaction among expertise level, typicality, and illness script com-
ponent, the reading times of the separate enabling conditions and
consequences parts ofcases were analyzed in a 2 X 2 X 2 ANaYA
with expertise level as the between-subjects factor and typicality
and illness script component (i.e., enabling conditions or conse-
quences) as within-subject factors. In a second 2 X 2 X 2 ANaYA,
the influence of typicality of preceding enabling conditions on the
reading times of subsequent prototypical and atypical consequences
was investigated.
The case evaluation latencies and the percentage estimates were
analyzed in a 2 X 5 ANaYA, with expertise level as the between-
subjects factor and case type as the within-subject factor. In this
analysis, the NO cases were included because they were expected
to yield extreme values (i.e., short case evaluation latencies and
low probability estimates).
Finally, reaction times and probability estimates for the NO
cases were analyzed separately, as an outside control, and con-
trasted with PP and AA type cases in separate 2 X 2 ANOYAs.
a significant main effect of case type [F(3, 174) =
18.556, MSe = 920.194, p < .0001], but no significant
interaction between expertise level and case type. Table 1
shows the results.
From Table 1 it can be seen that consistently for all
case types, family physicians were on the average faster
than 6th-year students. It took 6th-year students about
14% more time to read a case description than it did
family physicians. Furthermore, reading times increased
from PP type cases via AP and PA type cases to AA type
cases, while the NO type cases, which were not included
in this analysis, appeared to fall somewhere in between.
These results support at least one important prediction of
the illness script theory: Experienced physicians have
well-formed illness scripts that enable them to process
case information more rapidly than can 6th-year students;
generally, the better the fit between the incoming infor-
mation and the activated illness script, the faster this new
information is processed. Therefore, completely proto-
typical cases are processed most rapidly, and an increas-
ing degree of atypicality results in longer processing
times.
The absence of an interaction between expertise level
and case typicality for the reading times of the 4 case
types suggests that typicality has to a large extent the
same effect for both 6th-year students and family physi-
cians. This finding is not in line with the illness script
theory. However, what we are particularly interested in is
a possible three-way interaction between expertise level,
typicality, and illness script component (i.e., enabling
conditions or consequences). Hence, a2 X 2 X 2 ANOYA
of reading times with expertise level as the between-
subjects factor and typicality and illness script as the
within-subject factor was performed. Case statements that
were either a mixture of enabling conditions and conse-
quences, or that consisted of enabling conditions occur-
ring after the first consequence in a case," were not in-
cluded in this analysis; neither were the case evaluation
latencies. Thus, in contrast to the previous 2 X 4 ANOYA,
the present analysis involved, for each case, only "pure"
enabling conditions and "pure" consequences.
The results are displayed in Figure 1. Apart from the
already mentioned significant main effect of expertise
level significant main effects were found for illness script
Table 1
Average Reading Times (in Milliseconds/Word) for Whole
Cases as a Function of Expertise Level and Case Type
Note-PP, enabling conditions and consequences prototypical; AP,en-
abling conditions atypical, consequences prototypical; PA, enabling
conditions prototypical, consequences atypical; AA, both enabling
conditions and consequences atypical; NO, case description inconsis-
tent with illness script header. *N = 30.
RESULTS
Case Reading Times
Analysis of variance of the average reading times for
complete cases, expressed in milliseconds per word,
with expertise level as the between-subjects factor and
case type (the NO cases not included) as the within-
subject factor showed a significant main effect of exper-
tise level [F(l,58) = 4.244, MS e = 13,648.488,p < .05],
Expertise Level
Sixth-year students"
Family physicians"
M
PP
230
190
210
AP
240
221
230
Case Type
PA
253
224
238
AA
268
232
250
NO
246
218
232
M
247
217
232
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family physicians
Figure 1. Reading times (RT, expressed in milliseconds/word) ofindividual enabling conditions
and consequences case parts as a function of typicality of enabling conditions and consequences
for 6th-year students (left-hand panel) and experienced family physicians (right-hand panel).
component[F(l,58) = 92.548,MSe = 797.538,p<.0001]
and typicality [F(l,58) = 37.067, MSe = 671.971, P <
.0001], and a significant interaction between typicality
and illness script component was also found [F(l,58) =
16.332, MSe = 632.876,p < .0005]. The two-way inter-
actions between expertise level and illness script compo-
nent and between expertise level and typicality were not
significant; nor was the three-way interaction among ex-
pertise level, typicality, and illness script component. Fig-
ure 1 shows that in general, typical case parts were pro-
cessed more rapidly than were atypical case parts, and
consequences more rapidly than enabling conditions.
From this figure, it can also be seen that the typicality X
illness script component interaction can be accounted
for by prototypical consequences being processed more
rapidly than were atypical consequences, while typical-
ity of enabling conditions does not seem to have exerted
a significant influence on processing speed. However, as
the three-way interaction among expertise level, typical-
ity, and illness script component was not significant, it
cannot be concluded from the data that the typicality X
illness script component interaction should be attributed
differentially to the two expertise levels: Apart from a
general effect ofexpertise, reading speed of both expertise
groups for enabling conditions information was scarcely
influenced by typicality. Thus, the data do not suggest a
processing advantage of expert physicians for prototyp-
ical enabling conditions.
However, since the experimental setup did not allow
for a complete separation of enabling conditions and
consequences because the enabling conditions always
occurred first in the case descriptions, it is in fact not
possible to independently assess the reading times of
consequences statements: They will probably be influ-
enced by the typicality of the preceding enabling condi-
tions. For example, the processing of atypical conse-
quences may be accelerated by the preceding prototypical
enabling conditions. Of course, any influence the other
way around is excluded. Thus, in order to investigate the
effect of typicality of preceding enabling conditions on
the processing of subsequent consequences, an addi-
tional2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was performed, with expertise
level as the between-subjects factor, and typicality ofen-
abling conditions and typicality of consequences as
within-subject factors; the dependent variable in this analy-
sis was the average reading time ofthe consequences part
of the cases.
Figure 2 shows the results. The analysis revealed the
expected main effects of expertise level [F(l,58) =
4.975, MSe = l5,307.430,p < .05], of typicality of en-
abling conditions [F(l,58) = 4.742, MSe = 11,097.602,
P < .05], and of typicality of consequences [F(1,58) =
42.410, MSe = 1,587.7l2,p < .0001]. In addition, a sig-
nificant two-way interaction between typicality of en-
abling conditions and consequences [F(l,58) = 5.559,
MSe = 1,477.799,p < .05], and a borderline significant
three-way interaction among expertise level, typicality
of enabling conditions, and typicality of consequences
[F(l,58) = 3.833, MSe = l477.799,p < .06] was found.
Inspection of Figure 2 shows that reading times of atyp-
ical consequences were relatively independent of the
typicality of the preceding enabling conditions, while
reading times of prototypical consequences were influ-
enced by typicality ofthe preceding enabling conditions:
If the latter were prototypical, subsequent prototypical
consequences were processed particularly rapidly; the
two-way interaction between typicality of enabling con-
ditions and consequences attests to this conclusion. How-
ever,a comparison ofthe two panels of Figure 2 also shows
that this enabling conditions X consequences interaction
probably can be attributed completely to the data of the
experienced physicians: For the 6th-year students, the
effects of typicality of enabling conditions and conse-
quences seem to have been additive, whereas the experi-
RT in msec/word
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Figure 2. Reading times (Rf') of prototypical and atypical consequences as a function of exper-
tise level and typicality of the preceding enabling conditions.
enced physicians showed particularly rapid processing
times for prototypical consequences preceded by proto-
typical enabling conditions (see the right-hand panel of
Figure 2). Therefore, though we did not find evidence
for the hypothesis that the influence of typicality of en-
abling conditions and consequences on reading times
was different for subjects at different expertise levels
(Figure 1), the data do suggest that prototypical enabling
conditions had an accelerating effect on expert physi-
cians' reading speed of subsequent prototypical conse-
quences, an effect that was absent for 6th-year students.
The speed by which 6th-year students processed (proto-
typical or atypical) consequences seems to have been
comparatively independent from the nature of the pre-
ceding enabling conditions.
Finally, the influence of inconsistent information was
investigated in separate analyses comparing the NO type
cases with either completely prototypical or completely
atypical cases. An ANOVAofreading times ofcomplete
cases, with expertise level as the between-subjects factor
and case type (PP versus NO) as the within-subject factor
showed a significant effect of expertise level [F( 1,58) =
4.969, MSe = 6878.022,p < .05] and a significant effect
of case type [F(1,58) = 15.944, MSe = 911.881, p <
.0005], but no significant interaction. Thus, NO type cases
were processed significantly more slowly than completely
prototypical cases by subjects at both expertise levels.
Although a similar ANOVAofAA versus NO type cases
showed only a borderline significant effect of expertise
level [F(1,58) = 3.48, MSe = 9093.184,p < .07], again a
significant effect of case type was found [F(1,58) =
12.304, MSe = 793.138, P < .001], and no significant in-
teraction. Apparently, NO type cases were processed sig-
nificantly more rapidly than were AA type cases. These
results suggest that, on the one hand, deciding to reject
a script takes more processing time than just assimilating
prototypical, script-fitting information into an already
active script, but rejecting takes less time than does pro-
cessing ofcases for which it remains inconclusivewhether
they are an instantiation of an activated script. Indeed,
this conclusion was supported by analyses of the sepa-
rate enabling conditions and consequences parts of the
NO cases. These analyses revealed what might be called
a "processing speed gradient": The enabling conditions
of these cases were processed at a speed of 278 msec/
word, while the consequences took only 203 msec/word
(computed over both expertise groups). Thus, at the be-
ginning of the NO cases, the evidently contradictory in-
formation, probably as the consequence of a surprise ef-
fect, takes relatively more time to be processed, whereas
by the time the first consequences appear on the screen,
subjects will have decided that the patient described in
the case is not suffering from the announced disease. This
applies to 6th-year students as well as experts. Apart from
the family physicians having a general speed advantage
over their less experienced colleagues, performances of
both groups on the NO cases were highly similar.
Case Evaluation Latencies
Once faced with the case evaluation question, sub-
jects had to decide as quickly as possible whether the
presented case description actually would match some-
one with the specified disease. Since subjects knew that
the case evaluation question would eventually be pre-
sented, it seems reasonable to expect that they had al-
ready tried to decide during the case presentation whether
the patient description actually matched the announced
illness. It might be expected that for relatively clear-cut
cases (i.e., PP cases and NO cases), they would have been
able to give a rapid answer to the case evaluation ques-
tion. For other case types, they might have wanted to pon-
der some time before opting for a definite answer.
The results are displayed in Table 2. Since differences
in the length of the case evaluation question were negli-
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gible (the only difference being the length of the name of
the illness), raw decision times are presented instead of
the decision times in milliseconds/word. The data in Ta-
ble 2 indicate that this decision was generally not taken
too rashly. A 2 X 5 ANOYA of the raw reading times,
with level ofexpertise as the between-subjects factor and
case type as the within-subject factor revealed no signifi-
cant main effect oflevel ofexpertise. It revealed a signif-
icantmain effect ofcase type [F(4,232) = 25.007,MSe =
4,597,629.911, P < .0001], but no significant interac-
tion. From Table 2 it can be seen that, in ascending order,
the case evaluation question led to increasing response
latencies from NO cases, via PP, AP,and PAcases to AA
cases, for both expertise levels. A separate comparison
between NO type cases and PP type cases revealed that
the case evaluation latencies for the former type ofcases
were indeed significantly shorter than for the latter type
[F(1,58) = 20.29,MSe = 2,314,294.047,p<.000l]. This
finding also supports the conclusion that by the time the
case evaluation question was presented for a NO case,
subjects were fairly confident that the case was not an in-
stantiation of the activated illness script. It should be re-
marked that although PP type cases were generally
processed more rapidly than were NO type cases (Ta-
ble 1), the case evaluation latencies for PP type cases were
longer than those for NO type cases (Table 2). Appar-
ently, subjects at both expertise levels were more strongly
inclined to reject NO cases than to accept PP cases.
Probability Estimates
The results of the analysis of the probability estimates
are depicted in Table 3 and Figure 3. A 2 X 5 ANOYA of
the data in Table 3 (NO type cases included) revealed no
significant main effect ofexpertise level, but it did not re-
veal a significant effect of case type [F(4,224) = 235.961,
MSe = 156.263,p < .0001]. The interaction between ex-
pertise level and case type was not significant. The most
right-hand column of Table 3 shows that the expertise
groups did not differ in terms of their general inclination
to assign probability estimates. Thus, all differences be-
tween expert and nonexpert probability estimates within
the respective columns of Table 3 may be considered a
consequence ofdifferent likelihood of illness script instan-
tiation with the same case information by subjects at dif-
ferent expertise levels. Comparison of the column means
in the table shows that manipulating typicality of en-
abling conditions and consequences had a profound ef-
fect on probability estimates: For both expertise levels,
the probability estimates declined from PP type cases via
Ap, PA, and AA type cases to the NO type cases. Thus,
subjects generally assigned a high disease probability to
the patients described in the PP case variants (about
76.5% average over both levels of expertise), while for
the AA case variants, these estimates were much lower
(about 41% over both levels ofexpertise). The AP and PA
case types fell somewhere in between, with mean prob-
ability estimates of 61.19% and 55.30%, respectively.
Disease probability estimates ofthe NO cases, averaged
over both expertise groups, did not exceed 10%. A sepa-
rate comparison ofAA and NO type cases revealed a sig-
nificant difference between these two types [F(1,57) =
150.869, MSe = 184.075, P < .0001]. Therefore, it can
be concluded that even completely atypical cases had a
significantly higher likelihood of instantiating an acti-
vated illness script than contradictory cases; the differ-
ence in probability estimates amounted to 30% (Table 3).
It was also hypothesized that for 6th-year students,
typicality ofenabling conditions, unlike typicality of con-
Table 2
Average Raw Reading Times (in Milliseconds) for the Case Evaluation
Question as a Function of Expertise Level and Case Type
Case Type
Expertise Level PP AP PA AA NO M
Sixth-year students* 4,136 4,401 5,797 6,252 2,488 4,615
Family physicians* 3,426 4,509 5,069 5,852 2,572 4,286
M 3,781 4,455 5,432 6,052 2,530 4,450
Note-PP, enabling conditions and consequences prototypical; AP, enabling condi-
tions atypical, consequences prototypical; PA,enabling conditions prototypical, con-
sequences atypical; AA, both enabling conditions and consequences atypical; NO,
case description inconsistent with illness script header. *N = 30.
Table 3
Average Probability Estimates (Expressed as Percentages)
as a Function of Expertise Level and Case Type
Case Type
Expertise Level PP AP PA AA NO M
Sixth-year students* 73.11 62.33 53.11 40.86 12.13 48.31
Family physicianst 79.67 60.12 57.34 40.77 7.74 49.13
M 76.50 61.19 55.30 40.81 9.86 48.73
Note-Pp, enabling conditions and consequences prototypical; AP, enabling condi-
tions atypical, consequences prototypical; PA,enabling conditions prototypical, con-
sequences atypical; AA, both enabling conditions and consequences atypical; NO,
case description inconsistent with illness script header. *N = 28. tN = 30.
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Figure 3. Probability estimates as a function of typicality and expertise levelfor enabling condi-
tions (left-hand panel) and consequences (right-hand panel).
sequences, would not contribute much to the probability
estimates assigned to a case. For experienced physicians,
on the other hand, both typicality ofenabling conditions
and typicality ofconsequences would influence the prob-
ability estimates. Thus, an interaction was expected be-
tween typicality of enabling conditions and expertise
level, with the more experienced group showing sensi-
tivity to typicality ofenabling conditions, and the less ex-
perienced group not, or, ifanything, at least not to the same
extent. However, as we have no probability estimates for
individual case parts, but only for complete cases (i.e.,
for 4 specific typicality combinations ofenabling condi-
tions and consequences), it was not possible to analyze
the data in a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA; we had to revert to two
separate 2 X 2 ANOVAs instead. In the first of these
analyses, the average probability estimates of PP cases
and PA cases were contrasted with those of AP and AA
cases in order to assess the effect oftypicality ofenabling
conditions; in the second analysis, the average probabil-
ity estimates of PP cases and AP cases were contrasted
with those ofPA cases and AA cases in order to assess the
effect of typicality of consequences.
The first 2 X 2 ANOVA, with expertise level as the
between-subjects factor and typicality of enabling con-
ditions as the within-subject factor, revealed, apart from
the expected main effect of typicality [F(1,57) = 97.993,
MSe = 67.129, P < .0001], indeed a significant inter-
action between expertise level and typicality [F( 1,57) =
4.301, MSe = 67.129, P < .05]. In Figure 3 (left-hand
panel), the results are displayed graphically. It can be
seen from this figure that experienced family physicians
generally assigned higher probability estimates to cases
with prototypical enabling conditions and lower proba-
bility estimates to cases with atypical enabling conditions,
whereas 6th-year students showed less sensitivity to this
typicality manipulation, even though it cannot be con-
cluded that the 6th-year students were altogether insen-
sitive to typicality of enabling conditions.
In Figure 3 (right-hand panel), the results of the sec-
ond 2 X 2 ANOVA,with expertise level as the between-
subjects factor and typicality of consequences as the
within-subject factor, are presented. Apart from the gen-
eral typicalityeffect[F(1,57) = 96.911,MSe = 130.601,
P < .0001], no other significant results were obtained for
the consequences; indeed, visual inspection of Figure 3
(right-hand panel) easily confirms that the effects of ex-
pertise level and typicality ofconsequences are additive.
A comparison ofthe two panels in Figure 3 also suggests
that typicality of consequences in general played a
slightly more important role in determining probability
estimates than did typicality of enabling conditions, es-
pecially for the 6th-year students.
Thus, unlike the case reading time data, the results ofthe
analysis of the probability estimates support the hypothe-
sis that experienced family physicians were more inclined
than were 6th-year students to take typicality of enabling
conditions into account when determining the probability
of a case being an instantiation of a specific illness script.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, the influence of expertise level
and typicality of case information on case processing
times and case probability estimates was investigated. In
this section, we will elaborate on the implications of the
present results for the illness script theory. First, it can be
concluded that manipulating typicality of case informa-
tion turned out to be a powerful experimental tool to in-
vestigate processing speed and judgment of medical
(clinical) information: Consistently large differences
were found in processing times and probability estimates
as a function of case typicality. Thus, the present study
underscores the findings of Bellezza and Bower (1981)
and Yekovich and Walker (1986) that experimental ma-
nipulation of typicality of story information can be used
to investigate script processing characteristics.
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As far as processing times are concerned, general ef-
fects ofexpertise level, typicality, and illness script com-
ponent were found: Experts were faster than nonexperts,
typical information was processed more rapidly than was
atypical information, and consequences were processed
more rapidly than were enabling conditions. This latter
effect, however, may have been due to the fact that con-
sequences were always preceded by enabling conditions,
and illness script instantiation may have been already
partly accomplished by the time the subjects were pro-
cessing the consequences information. Althoughthe three-
way interaction of expertise level, typicality, and illness
script component did not reach significance, and hence
it cannot be definitely concluded from the data that ex-
perienced subjects processed enabling conditions infor-
mation in a more script-like way than less experienced
subjects, the results at least suggest that completely proto-
typical cases have a special status for expert physicians:
Reading times for these cases for this group of subjects
were much shorter than those for any other combination
ofcase type and expertise level (Table 1). This conclusion
is bolstered by the data on the case evaluation latencies.
In a more fine-grained analysis, we took into considera-
tion the fact that the processing times of case parts were
not independent (i.e., processing of information appear-
ing at a later point in the case description may have been
influenced by the typicality of the preceding informa-
tion), and found that processing ofprototypical enabling
conditions facilitated the processing of subsequent pro-
totypical consequences for experienced physicians, but
not for 6th-year students (Figure 2). Conversely, for ex-
perienced physicians, atypical enabling conditions seemed
to decelerate the processing speed of subsequent proto-
typical consequences, whereas for the 6th-year students,
this effect was small. Thus, typicality ofenabling conse-
quences indeed appears to have had a differential effect
at the two expertise levels included in the present study,
a finding that may reflect the hypothesized differential
integration ofenabling conditions into illness script struc-
tures and thus support the proposed developmentalcourse
of illness scripts. On the other hand, the data also support
the assumption that advanced students already do pos-
sess script-like structures: Generally, they are influenced
to about the same extent by typicality of case informa-
tion as expert family physicians; the absence ofan inter-
action between expertise level and typicality attests to
this conclusion.
The results also showed that if case descriptions devi-
ate too much from what is feasible given a specific ill-
ness script, reading times show a significant drop. Thus,
after some initial hesitation or surprise reaction, NO cases
were processed relativelyquickly. Apparently, for this type
ofcase, less processing is required, probably because al-
ready in an early stage of the case presentation, subjects
have decided that the activated illness script cannot be
instantiated by the case information; hence, they have re-
jected it and do not feel inclined to further try to fit in-
coming information into it. In fact, in the present study,
an inverted-U relationship between "script-fitting qual-
ity" of case information and processing speed was
found: Both information that can be easily integrated
into an activated script and information that evidently
contradicts allowed script features or slot values are
processed fast (i.e., without much elaboration or consid-
eration), whereas information of intermediate fitting
quality (i.e., atypical information) requires additional
processing time. This conclusion is supported by the long
case evaluation latencies for partly and completely atyp-
ical cases (Table 2).
As far as probability estimates are concerned, a gen-
eral effect ofcase typicality was found. Completely pro-
totypical cases were assigned probability percentages in
the 70s, and completely atypical cases were assigned
probability percentages in the lower 40s. Cases with ei-
ther prototypical enabling conditions or prototypical
consequences (but not both) received probability per-
centages in the range of 55%-62%. Thus, both typical-
ity ofenabling conditions and typicality ofconsequences
contributed to the overall subjective likelihood esti-
mates. Separate comparisons of the influence of typical-
ity ofenabling conditions and typicality ofconsequences
revealed that experienced physicians were somewhat
more inclined to take typicality of enabling conditions
into consideration than were 6th-year students, although
probability estimates of subjects at both expertise levels
were clearly influenced by this factor. As to the typical-
ity of consequences, no differential effect of expertise
level was found. This finding (i.e., the somewhat higher
sensitivity of more experienced subjects for contextual
and patient background information) is in line with the
proposed development of illness scripts.
On the basis of the present results, no definite con-
clusions can be drawn concerning the role of illness
scripts in diagnostic situations. It should be recalled that
Hobus et al. (1987, 1990) found that experienced physi-
cians who had access to enabling conditions were able to
use this information in activating diagnostic hypotheses,
whereas inexperienced physicians were much less able
to do so. A previous study by Custers et al. (1992) showed
that this phenomenon could not be accounted for by a
mere lack of knowledge of enabling conditions on the
part of the less experienced subjects. The results of the
present study support the idea that integration of infor-
mation about enabling conditions into illness script
structures is a critical factor in the later stages of devel-
opment of medical diagnostic knowledge, even though
the size of the effects in an experimental task was rela-
tively small and requires confirmation by future studies.
Expert physicians seem to possess a particular sensitivity
for completely prototypical cases, that is, patient descrip-
tions in which both contextual factors and complaints,
signs, and symptoms are in line with the default values
for the applicable illness script. This particular sensitiv-
ity is not shared by advanced students, even though the
latter subjects were evidently influenced by typicality of
enabling conditions as well as by consequences. The pres-
ent results also suggest that expert physicians may be
more able to profit from prototypical consequences than
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nonexperts, a possibility that was not included in the
Hobus et al. (1987, 1990) studies because these authors
did not investigate the influence of knowledge of conse-
quences on diagnostic hypothesis formation.
We are inclined to think that our present results may
have a broader range of application than the medical do-
main. Diagnosis is an important aspect of many real-life
problem-solving situations. It remains a challenge for fu-
ture studies to develop a proper conceptualization ofthe rel-
evant knowledge structures with an emphasis on knowledge
accessibility, rather than on the mere presence or absence
of knowledge, and to discover why subjects at intermedi-
ate levels ofexpertise do possess the relevant knowledge,
but are unable to use it in many diagnostic situations.
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NarES
I. In line with previous research (Custers et aI., 1992),prototypical
and atypical are defined as opposite points on the underlying dimen-
sion of typicality.
2. The Dutch medical curriculum consists of a 4-year training pro-
gram in the biomedical and clinical sciences, followed by a 2-year
clerkship program.
3. Some subjects evidentlymisinterpreted the probability estimation
instruction in that they thought their own answer on the preceding case
evaluation question, rather than the probability that the patient suffered
from the announced disease, should be evaluated (thus, they re-
sponded, e.g., "90%," if they were fairly sure that their no answer had
been correct).
4. To make case descriptions as natural as possible, we had to con-
struct some statementswith a mixture of enablingconditionsand conse-
quences (e.g., a current complaint that referred to a previous com-
plaint), and sometimes we had the patient reveal an enabling condition
at the end of the case (e.g., "I've been on holiday to Spain lately.").
APPENDIX A
Names of the Diseases Used in the Study
Diseases on which the three practice cases were based:
Perforated otitis media
Monilia of the mouth
Dyspepsia ofa nervous origin (also called nervous gastritis)
Diseases on which the 16 experimental cases were based:
Metastatic sigmoid cancer (metastases in the lungs)
Aneurism of the aortic artery (threatening rupture)
Urosepsis
Dermatitis peri-oralis
Vaginal candidiosis
Kidney stones (colic)
Carcinoma of the head of the pancreas
Stomatitis aftosa (multiple small ulcera in the mouth)
Digitalis intoxication
Epidural hematoma
Nervous abdominal pain
Pediculosis pubis
Herpes zoster
Meningitis or encephalitis as a complication of mumps
Hepatitis A
Pre-infarct syndrome
Diseases on which the five No cases were based:
Pfeiffer's disease (announced as, "Is this a patient with
Hodgkin's disease?")
Pernicious anemia (announced as, "Is this a patient with
iron-deficiency anemia or hypochromatic anemia?")
Perforated gastric ulcer (announced as, "Is this a patient
with reflux-oesophagitis?")
Seborrheic dermatitis (announced as, "Is this a patient with
impetigo?")
Thyrotoxicosis (announced as, "Is this a patient with
hypothyroid?")
APPENDIXB
Example of a Case Description With Four Variants
Case 6: Kidney stones (colic)
The number preceding each text phrase refers to the number
of the screen image in which that particular phrase was pre-
sented.
PP variant:
1. Man, age 47, married, 3 children
2. Occupation: storekeeper
3. Medical history: bronchitis at age 30
4. Had his leg broken 6 years ago, as a consequence of a
car accident
5. Four years ago: treated with medicaments for kidney
stones
6. Some of his relatives are known to have coronary dis-
ease and diabetes mellitus
7. His wife rings up, asks the physician for an immediate
visit:
8. Just like a few years ago, her husband is rolling across
the room because ofthe pain. He is also vomiting almost
continuously
9. When the physician arrives, the pain has just subsided.
The patient is sitting on the sofa and recovering a bit
10. At the moment, the patient doesn't look very ill
II. He complains about having had a convulsive abdominal
pain abreast of the navel, at the left side
12. The pain is radiating to his groin
13. The pain emerges very suddenly, and then gradually
subsides. During an attack he almost can't stand it
14. Earlier that day he had already seen some blood in his
urine, but had had no pain at the time
15. Is this a patient with a kidney stone colic? (yes/no)
16. Please estimate the probability that this person has a
kidney stone colic in a percentage (range, 0%-100%)
Comment:
The prototypical patient with kidney stone colic is a male,
aged 35 to 55 years (Statement 1), who has had this kind of
complaint before (Statement 5). As the clinical picture is
often rather impressive, it is not unusual that relatives are in
panic (Statement 7). Typical1y, the pain is of a convulsive na-
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ture, about half-way down the abdomen, and one-sided (left
or right, Statement 11). Radiation to the groin is also very
prototypical (Statement 12). The same holds for the pain-
free intervals, during which the patient appears normal
(Statements 9, 10, 13). During an attack, people are literally
running or cringing (Statements 8, 13). Blood in the urine
may also occur, before or after an attack (Statement 14).
Statements 2,3,4, and 6 are added to complete the case de-
scription (occupation is usually mentioned, as are some
rather irrelevant medical history items with regard to the
present condition).
AP variant:
1. Woman, 32 years, married, 2 children
2. Occupation: works as clerical staff at a large school
3. Medical history: bronchitis at age 20
4. Had her leg broken 6 years ago, as a consequence of a
car accident
5. Has been taking the contraceptive pill for 9 years, inter-
rupted for pregnancies
6. Some of her relatives are known to have coronary dis-
ease and diabetes mellitus
7. Her husband rings up, asks the physician for an imme-
diate visit:
8. He is afraid that his wife is dying: She is rolling through
the room because of the pain. She is also vomiting al-
most continuously
9. When the physician arrives, the pain has just subsided.
The patient is sitting on the sofa and recovering a bit
10. At the moment, the patient doesn't look very ill
11. She complains about having had a convulsive abdominal
pain abreast of the navel, at the left side
12. The pain is radiating to her groin
13. The pain emerges very suddenly, and then gradually
subsides. During an attack she almost can't stand it
14. Earlier that day she had already seen some blood in her
urine, but had had no pain at the time
15. Is this a patient with a kidney stone colic? (yes/no)
16. Please estimate the probability that this person has a
kidney stone colic in a percentage (range, 0%-100%)
Comment:
Kidney stones are not often found in young women. In ad-
dition, nothing in her medical history points to the possible
existence ofthis ailment. The symptoms (the same as in the
previous description) are very prototypical, though.
PA variant:
I. Man, age 47, married, 3 children
2. Occupation: storekeeper
3. Medical history: bronchitis at age 30
4. Had his leg broken 6 years ago, as a consequence of a
car accident
5. Four years ago: treated with medicaments for kidney
stones
6. Some of his relatives are known to have coronary dis-
ease and diabetes mellitus
7. The patient appears at consulting hour with the com-
plaint:
8. Since the other day, occasionally a sharp, stabbing pain
in the abdomen, abreast of the navel, at the right side
9. The pain is radiating to his groin
10. He had already felt for a few days a somewhat nagging
sensation in this part of his abdomen
11. And it is still nagging, now, in between the stabs
12. Upon inquiry, the patient admits having felt an urge to
micturate more often than usual, the last few days, but
the amount of urine each time was small
13. He says he doesn't feel very well
14. And reports having measured 37.8° (Centigrade) tem-
perature
15. Is this a patient with a kidney stone colic? (yes/no)
16. Please estimate the probability that this person has a
kidney stone colic in a percentage (range, 0%-100%)
Comment:
This pattern of symptoms and complaints is possibly, but
not very likely, caused by kidney stones.
AA variant:
1. Woman, 32 years, married, 2 children
2. Occupation: works as clerical staff at a large school
3. Medical history: bronchitis at age 20
4. Had her leg broken 6 years ago, as a consequence of a
car accident
5. Has been taking contraceptive pills for 9 years, inter-
rupted for pregnancies
6. Some of her relatives are known to have coronary dis-
ease and diabetes mellitus
7. The patient appears at consulting hour with the com-
plaint:
8. Since the other day, occasionally a sharp, stabbing pain
in the abdomen, abreast of the navel, at the right side
9. The pain is radiating to her groin
10. She had already felt for a few days a somewhat nagging
sensation in this part of her abdomen
II. And it is still nagging, now, in between the stabs
12. Upon inquiry, the patient admits having felt an urge to
micturate more often than usual, the last few days, but
the amount of urine each time was small
13. She says she doesn't feel very well
14. And reports having measured 37.8° (Centigrade) tem-
perature
15. Is this a patient with a kidney stone colic? (yes/no)
16. Please estimate the probability that this person has a
kidney stone colic in a percentage (range, 0%-100%)
Comment:
Upon seeing this patient and hearing her complaints, the
physician will probably not immediately think of kidney
stones. However, the possibility of this disease is surely not
ruled out.
Note-c-Plt enabling conditions and consequences prototypical;
Ap, enabling conditions atypical, consequences prototypical;
PA, enabling conditions prototypical, consequences atypical;
AA, both enabling conditions and consequences atypical; NO,
case description inconsistent with illness script header.
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APPENDIXC
Number of Statements (Screen Images)
and Words per Case Description
Case No. Statements No. Words
Practice
Perforated otitis media 10 98
Monilia of the mouth 9 81
Nervous gastritis 17 177
NO
Hypothyroid 14 148
Impetigo 12 132
Iron-deficiencyanemia* IS 177
Hodgkin's disease 16 171
Reflux oesophagi tis 14 138
Variant
PP AP PA AA
Experimental
Metastatic sigmoid cancer 14 137 128 137 138
Rupturing aneurism 14 172 176 164 167
Urosepsis 14 132 131 132 131
Dermatitis peri-oralis 14 172 176 164 167
Vaginal candidiosis 14 136 165 144 164
Kidney stones colic 14 167 165 138 147
Carcinoma of the head
of the pancreas IS 150 145 159 ISS
Stomatitis aftosa 10 94 94 85 86
Digitalis intoxication 12 1I0 130 123 117
Epidural hematoma 14 180 160 178 157
Nervous abdominal pain 19 193 2I6 20 I 236
Pediculosis pubis 8 90 106 93 109
Herpes zoster II 105 94 106 96
Meningitis (as a
complication of mumps) 13 121122 liS 117
Hepatitis A 17 140 140 147 140
Pre-infarct syndrome 18 160 178 185 186
Note~Pp, enabling conditions and consequences prototypical; AP, enabling condi-
tions atypical, consequences prototypical; PA, enabling conditions prototypical, con-
sequences atypical; AA, both enabling conditions and consequences atypical; NO,
case description inconsistent with illness script header. *This case was omitted
from the analysis.
APPENDIXD
Experimental Design of the Sequences
IA 2A 3A 4A IB 2B 3B 4B
prl prl prl prl prl prl prl prl
pr2 pr2 pr2 pr2 pr2 pr2 pr2 pr2
pr3 pr3 pr3 pr3 pr3 pr3 pr3 pr3
4 4 4 4 14AP 14PA 14AA 14PP
SPA 5AA 5PP SAP 15PP 15AP 15PA 15AA
6PA 6AA 6PP 6AP 16 16 16 16
7AA 7PP 7AP 7PA 17AA 17PP 17AP 17PA
8 8 8 8 18PA 18AA 18PP 18AP
9AA 9PP 9AP 9PA 19PA 19AA 19PP 19AP
IOPP 10AP 10PA 10AA 20 20 20 20
IIAP IIPA IIAA IIPP 21PP 21AP 21PA 21AA
12AA 12PP 12AP 12PA 22 22 22 22
13AP 13PA 13AA 13PP 23PP 23AP 23PA 23AA
24AP 24PA 24AA 24PP
14AP 14PA 14AA 14PP
15PP 15AP I5PA 15AA 4 4 4 4
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APPENDIX D (Continued)
16
17AA
18PA
19PA
20
21PP
22
23PP
24AP
16
17PP
18AA
19AA
20
2lAP
22
23AP
24PA
16
17AP
18PP
19PP
20
21PA
22
23PA
24AA
16 5PA 5AA
17PA 6PA 6AA
18AP 7AA 7PP
19AP 8 8
20 9AA 9PP
21AA 10PP 10AP
22 IIAP IIPA
23AA 12AA 12PP
24PP 13AP 13PA
5PP
6PP
7AP
8
9AP
10PA
IIAA
12AP
13AA
5AP
6AP
7PA
8
9PA
10AA
IIPP
12PA
13PP
Note-pr, practice case; Pp, enabling conditions and consequences prototypical; Ap, enabling
conditions atypical, consequences prototypical; PA, enabling conditions prototypical, conse-
quences atypical; AA, both enabling conditions and consequences atypical; NO, case descrip-
tion inconsistent with illness script header. Each sequence starts with three practice cases, which
are the same for all sequences. The experimental cases fall into one of 4 groups, with the same
case variant for each member of a particular group in a given sequence. For example, Cases 10,
15, 21, and 23 belong to I group, and in Sequence I, the PP variant of these cases is presented,
in Sequence 2 the AP variant, in Sequence 3 the PA variant, and in Sequence 4 the AA variant.
Each sequence contains 4 cases of each case variant. Cases 4, 8, 16, 20, and 22 are examples of
NO cases, of which only I variant exists. The A and B forms of each sequence differ only in the
order in which the experimental cases were presented.
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